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The creation of the post-war international legal regime for prisoners of war (POW), poses 
historians with something of a paradox. Never before had the need to update the 
humanitarian codes been more glaringly apparent. In Europe and Asia, war fighting between 
1939 and 1945 had assumed an almost medieval quality. Captives had frequently been 
killed, enslaved or conscripted into their eŶeŵies͛ armed forces; whole cities were 
obliterated by firestorms, whole peoples threatened with extinction. And yet despite these 
excesses, the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ǁilliŶgŶess aŶd ĐapaĐitǇ to revise the Geneva 
conventions remained open to question. Cold War political tensions contaminated 
international dialogue and distracted discussions over the future of humanitarianism and 
international law. The fact that a fresh set of conventions were agreed in 1949, including, 
for the first time, one covering civilians, was clearly ͚a ŶoteǁoƌthǇ eǀeŶt iŶ this daǇ aŶd age͛, 
as one participant put it, but the outcome had been confusing and contradictory.1 The 
western powers found themselves pressing for elements in the civilian code which they had 
only recently condemned at the Nuremburg trials.2 More worryingly, the arrival of atomic 
weapons cast doubt over whether conceptions of humanity, discrimination and 
proportionality were still relevant. Contemporary commentators like J. M. Spaight were 
therefore left ͚puzzled͛ ďǇ the ͚failuƌe of the poǁeƌs [...], to do anything to regulate those 
methods of war which, if continued, will make the [ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛] huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ pƌoǀisioŶs 
[…] ƌead like hǇpoĐƌitiĐal ŶoŶseŶse͛.3   
How the 1949 Conventions came into being, and the compromises and deals that 
were struck on the way, have been thoroughly explored elsewhere, and it serves no point to 
repeat the exercise here.4 Instead, this paper will focus on one of the key elements of the 
post-ǁaƌ ͚POW ƌegiŵe͛; Ŷaŵely the role of neutral bodies – state authorities acting as 
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͚pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛ oƌ huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ ageŶĐies suĐh as the IŶteƌŶatioŶal Coŵŵittee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) – in supervising the implementation of the 1949 POW convention. The role 
of oversight mechanisms was by no means new in 1949. By the time of the Great War, all 
major belligerents had come to rely on neutral ͚pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛ to suppleŵeŶt the ǁoƌk 
of civilian aid agencies and meet the needs of their nationals in enemy hands.5 The success 
of these initiatives led to protecting powers being accorded specific responsibilities in the 
POW convention of 1929. Although protecting powers were excluded from the Red Cross 
convention (dealing with sick and wounded on the battlefield) and states disagreed over the 
balance between the rights of the neutral inspectors and the security interests of the 
detaining powers, all of the major former belligerents agreed that protecting powers were 
needed to hold belligerents to their obligations under the POW convention.6 ͚OƌgaŶs of 
ĐoŶtƌol͛ ǁeƌe, theƌefoƌe, a core element in the modern POW regime: attitudes towards 
them after 1945 promises to tell us a great deal about contemporary expectations.7 This 
paper will examine the post-war debates over the type of organs of control required in the 
revised POW convention, and then assess how these faired in their first real test, the Korean 
War of 1950-1953. Before doing so, it will address what lessons the international 
community drew from its experiences in the 2nd world war and how these shaped future 
debates. 
 
* 
 
The general collapse of accepted standards of behaviour – by all sides – after 1937 was 
inevitably mirrored in the experience of the protecting powers and humanitarian agencies. 
Contrary to expectations, it was not so much the expansion of the concept of military 
necessity that stymied the work of neutral inspectors, as the political and ideological 
interests of the belligerents themselves.8 BeƌliŶ͛s disŵissal of “ǁedish effoƌts to pƌoteĐt 
Polish prisoners after 1939, on the grounds that Poland no longer existed as a state, was an 
eaƌlǇ haƌďiŶgeƌ of a poliĐǇ that ǁas sooŶ eǆteŶded to ŵost ĐoƌŶeƌs of Hitleƌ͛s Neǁ Oƌdeƌ.9 
An exception was made for Vichy France where Berlin grudgingly allowed the Vichy minister, 
George Scapini, to represent the interests of the 1.8 million French prisoners remaining in 
Germany after the armistice. But this was prompted by political considerations – a desire to 
shore up support for the Vichy regime amongst French prisoners and workmen in the Reich 
3 
 
– not humanitarian, and “ĐapiŶi͛s authoƌitǇ fell short of that stipulated under the 
convention.10 MosĐoǁ͛s atteŵpt to eŶlist “ǁedish protection after July 1941 was rebuffed, 
with disastrous consequences for POW mortality rates on both sides of the eastern front.11 
A similar situation existed in the Far East, where Tokyo applied the convention selectively. 
Although practice varied between different theatres, non-western prisoners were typically 
denied external assistance, and tight travel restrictions on neutral diplomats and delegates 
from the YMCA and ICRC ensured that European prisoners had largely to survive without the 
benefit of outside help for the duration of the war.12 Taking the war as a whole, some 
seventy percent of prisoners lived beyond the reach of third party protection.13 
 Yet if, in global terms, the record was a bleak one, the fact remains that in certain 
circumstances even brutal states such as the 3rd Reich would moderate their behaviour out 
of a concern for its impact on neutral inspection reports. The majority of British protests 
lodged by American diplomats in Berlin before December 1941 received satisfactory replies. 
Washington even came close to convincing the two belligerents to hold face-to-face talks 
over POW issues in the spring of 1941. The “ǁiss, though laĐkiŶg WashiŶgtoŶ͛s politiĐal 
muscle, capitalised on their position in representing both parties to the conflict, and helped 
head off several potential crises involving the treatment of POWs.14 Swiss diplomats were 
generally held in high regard, despite grumbles over the wording of camp inspection 
ƌepoƌts, oƌ BeƌŶe͛s oĐĐasioŶal foƌaǇ iŶto aƌeas deeŵed ďeǇoŶd its authority. The summary 
execution of the Allied ͚gƌeat esĐapeƌs͛ iŶ early 1944 naturally underlined the fragility of the 
POW regime and the speed with which Hitleƌ͛s ƌegiŵe Đould slip iŶto ďaƌďaƌisŵ. But the faĐt 
that this brutality was the exception rather than the rule had much to do with the presence 
of Swiss diplomats and ICRC delegates, holding the Nazi regime to its obligations under the 
POW convention, even in its final death throws.15 
 The 2nd world war thus provided a mixed legacy for third party involvement in POW 
affairs. PƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs, the pƌiŶĐipal ͚oƌgaŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛, remained widely recognised as 
the institution of choice, where ever possible. Their greatest supporter was probably the UK 
government, whose long experience of US protection, dating back to the Boer War, had 
made it particularly partial to state-based protection. Even states denied direct formal 
assistance of protecting powers, emerged from the war convinced in their utility. The one 
notable exception to this was the Soviet Union. Not only had Moscow fought the war 
entirely without the services of a protecting power, but it had refused to acknowledge 
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“ǁitzeƌlaŶd͛s claims to neutrality, on account of the real and perceived level of Swiss 
collaboration with the Nazi regime. Tentative Swiss attempts to re-establish diplomatic ties 
in late 1944 were publicly buffed, triggering the resignation of the Swiss foreign minister 
shortly afterwards; the following year Berne had to seek British help to secure the timely 
release of its Berlin embassy staff from Soviet custody.  
 The ǁaƌ͛s legaĐǇ foƌ huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶs suĐh as the IC‘C ǁas eǀeŶ ŵoƌe 
problematic. Although the ICRC had been formally recognised in the 1929 POW convention, 
its role was limited to dispensing ͚huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ seƌǀiĐes͛. Consequently, almost every aspect 
of its work for POWs depended on it first securing prior agreement from the governments 
concerned. Tƌue, the IC‘C͛s delegates had fuƌŶished ǀaluaďle Đaŵp inspection reports, 
overseen the repatriation of sick and wounded POWs and arranged for the delivery of relief 
parcels. It had also interceded in support of individuals – civilian internees and camp 
inmates – who lay beyond the reach of the protecting powers. Its efforts to bring succour to 
prisoners in the Far East probably exceeded those of the protecting power.16 But the war 
left deep scars on the ICRC͛s reputation. Its failure to speak out against the Holocaust, the 
intimacy of its relations with the ReiĐh͛s leadeƌship, its delegates͛ Ŷaiǀety in working with 
the Axis occupation forces in distributing relief supplies and their eŵďƌoilŵeŶt iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
exploitation of the Katyn incident in 1943, left the institution open to charges of 
collaboration that were difficult to shrug off.17 GeŶeǀa͛s staŶdiŶg ǁith the western 
governments were likewise marred by its outspoken criticism of Allied bombing of Axis 
cities, blockade of food supplies and denial of POW status from surrendered enemy forces 
in 1945.18 FiŶallǇ, GeŶeǀa͛s success in providing relief parcels was slowly eclipsed, especially 
in American eyes, by the role assumed by the national Red Cross societies – who produced 
the majority of the parcels – and the work undertaken at the international level by the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).19 Such work appeared to 
signal a shift in the focus of international relief activity from Geneva to New York and into 
the hands of the national societies, and stymie the IC‘C͛s hopes of staking a claim over this 
area of activity.  
 
** 
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The task of revising the 1929 conventions, and negotiating a code for the protection of 
civilians, was carried out over a four year period, culminating in a diplomatic conference in 
Geneva between 21 April and 12 August 1949. In between, the matter was debated at a 
number of Red Cross and governmental meetings, including the XVII International Red Cross 
conference in Stockholm in August 1948. Some components of the new supervisory 
mechanisms were agreed with little ado.20 The priority given to official protecting powers 
was aĐĐepted eaƌlǇ oŶ. ͚Common article 8͛, found in all of the 1949 conventions stated that 
they ͚shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers 
whose duty it is to safeguaƌd the iŶteƌests of the Paƌties to the CoŶfliĐt͛. ;emphasis added) A 
consensus also emerged over the need to block recourse to ͚“ĐapiŶi͛ ŵissioŶs. ͚Common 
article 10͛ prohibited the substitution of protecting powers with inferior agencies, based on 
͚speĐial agƌeeŵeŶts ďetǁeeŶ the Poǁeƌs oŶe of ǁhiĐh is ƌestƌiĐted, eǀeŶ teŵpoƌaƌilǇ, iŶ its 
freedom to negotiate with the other Power or its allies by reason of military events, more 
particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is 
oĐĐupied͛.  
So widespread was the belief in the importance of proper third party assistance that 
from the earliest drafts, agreement was reached on establishing what might be called a 
͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of pƌoteĐtioŶ͛. At the top was the traditional protecting power, operating with 
the consent of all parties, and with responsibilities eventually itemised in 34 of the 143 
articles of the 1949 POW convention. If this was not possible, for whatever reason, the 
detaining power was to request a second neutral state oƌ ͚aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ǁhiĐh offeƌs all 
guaƌaŶtees of iŵpaƌtialitǇ aŶd effiĐieŶĐǇ͛ to aĐt as a ͚suďstitute͛ protecting power. If all else 
failed, detaining powers were to ͚ƌeƋuest͛ oƌ ͚aĐĐept͛ the seƌǀiĐes of ͚a huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ 
organisation such as the ICRC͛ ǁhiĐh ǁould ͚assume the humanitarian functions performed 
ďǇ pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛. Though inelegantly expressed, the ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ offeƌed a 
chance of tackling the problems uncovered in the last war. Never before had the safety-net 
of prisoner protection and third party surveillance of the conventions been so tightly 
woven.21 
This was, however, the limit of the post-war consensus, and divisions over some of 
the outstanding issues proved so intractable that they came close to jeopardising the entire 
exercise. As in 1929, one of the central areas of debate concerned the scope of protecting 
poǁeƌs͛ supervisory authority and the extent to which they could encroach on state 
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prerogatives. In keeping with the attitude shown after 1941, Moscow was inclined to limit 
the scope of the protecting power mandates. An amendment tabled at the diplomatic 
conference called for an injunction against pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs ͚iŶfƌiŶg[iŶg] the soǀeƌeigŶtǇ of 
the “tate͛ oƌ aĐtiŶg iŶ ͚oppositioŶ to “tate seĐuƌitǇ oƌ ŵilitaƌǇ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͛. The western 
powers, by contrast, whose servicemen had generally benefited from third party protection, 
were reluctant to see neutral inspectors unduly impeded.22 When put to a vote, the 
majority decided that MosĐoǁ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs oǀeƌ state soǀeƌeigŶtǇ ǁeƌe misplaced. After all, 
the protecting powers͛ authority was restricted to only those actions required to ensure 
that parties lived up to their commitments, and in ratifying the convention, states freely 
entered into accepting these commitments.23 A compromise solution, sufficient to satisfy 
Soviet anxieties, was eventually agreed, whereby protecting powers were, at all times, to 
͚take aĐĐouŶt of the imperative necessities of seĐuƌitǇ of the “tate͛ aŶd avoid ͚eǆĐeed[ing] 
their missioŶ uŶdeƌ the ... CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛. An additional clause was added to the sick and 
wounded conventions – though not the POW and civilian codes – allowing states to impose 
͚eǆĐeptioŶal aŶd teŵpoƌaƌǇ͛ ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oŶ the pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌ if ͚ƌeŶdeƌed ŶeĐessaƌǇ ďǇ 
iŵpeƌatiǀe ŵilitaƌǇ ŶeĐessities͛.24 
Given the breadth of their duties, the possibility of protecting powers falling foul of 
these restrictions was perhaps slim. But the latitude left for detaining powers to define 
͚iŵpeƌatiǀe ŶeĐessitǇ͛ naturally disappointed those who had hoped to have closed this 
loophole at the Stockholm conference the previous year. Still, the fact that some 
accommodation had to be found on this issue was hardly new: the balance between 
humanitarianism and military necessity has been a recurrent theme since the 1860s, and in 
1949, the Soviet Union merely represented a position that had been held, twenty years 
earlier, by the Japanese and Romanians. It was, in this sense, a modern version of a familiar 
refrain.25  
What was new in the post-war debates, were questions over the identity and scope 
of those iŶstitutioŶs iŶĐluded iŶ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of pƌoteĐtioŶ͛. The first of these 
concerned the kind of institution deemed capable in extremis of acting in lieu of protecting 
powers. Discussion on this issue partly boiled down to a question of what role the ICRC 
should oĐĐupǇ as aŶ ͚oƌgaŶ of ĐoŶtƌol͛. At first sight, this might seem rather odd. After all, 
the ICRC had begun the codification of customary practice in 1864, and had been the 
principal architect and guardian of international humanitarian law ever since. It was the 
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ICRC that had first called for a revision of the conventions in 1945 and shepherded 
successive drafts through subsequent meetings. In a conference of national Red Cross 
societies held in the summer of 1946, most agreed that specific areas of competency for the 
ICRC had to be spelt out in the new conventions.26 
Critics of the ICRC were, however, thick on the ground after 1945 and there was no 
certainty that it would be able to retain its position, as of right, in the new conventions. The 
institution had already found itself under pressure in 1945 when the western powers 
resisted ICRC efforts to provide succour to Axis servicemen, who had been re-categorised as 
͚suƌƌeŶdeƌed eŶeŵǇ peƌsoŶŶel͛ aŶd deŶied pƌoteĐtioŶ uŶdeƌ the POW ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ.27 But its 
most outspoken critic was the Soviet government. MosĐoǁ͛s opposition was so trenchant 
that it absented itself from all meetings before 1949 on the grounds that the ICRC͛s 
lamentable wartime conduct disqualified it from hosting such events. Its denunciation of the 
ICRC three days before the opening of the Red Cross conference in Stockholm was 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ĐaustiĐ aŶd pƌoŵpted the oƌgaŶiseƌs to ƌesĐhedule the fiƌst daǇ͛s pƌoĐeediŶgs to 
allow the ICRC president, Paul Ruegger, to respond to Soviet charges. ‘ueggeƌ͛s speech and 
the thƌee ǀoluŵe ƌepoƌt oŶ the IC‘C͛s ǁaƌtiŵe opeƌations published for the occasion were 
well received, but few present could ignore the fact that Soviet opposition to the committee 
was deep-seated and likely to shape its subsequent view of the conventions.28  
In reality, Soviet criticism of the committee was important not so much in affecting 
the outcome of any particular vote – the eastern bloc vote was too small to muster a 
majority – but rather in influencing behaviour of other delegations. Geoffrey Best has 
argued that French delegations were particularly sensitive to Soviet wishes, in large part due 
to the waxing electoral fortunes of the communist party at home. He suggests that the 
FƌeŶĐh pƌoposal foƌ a ͚high iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đoŵŵittee͛ to oǀeƌsee the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs ǁas 
essentially driven by the desire to keep Moscow happy and provide an alternative 
mechanism to the ICRC.29 The ͚high iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đoŵŵittee͛ ĐoŵpƌisiŶg of thirty 
distinguished lawyers, luminaries and internatioŶal ͚eldeƌ statesŵeŶ͛ was to be convened at 
the staƌt of a ĐoŶfliĐt to ͚supeƌǀise the appliĐatioŶ aŶd eŶsuƌe ƌespeĐt foƌ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛.  
In fact, the Cahen-Salvador proposal, named after the lead French delegate, reflected a 
trend in French thinking that extended back before the war – the French had proposed a 
similar body at the 1929 conference – and was designed to deal with situations in which 
there were no neutral states to act as protecting powers, and no neutral Switzerland to 
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provide a base for the ICRC. First raised in 1947, the proposal for a high international 
committee had particular traction at the diplomatic conference where ͚eǆtƌeŵe pƌessuƌe͛ 
from the French had secured the presidency of one of the commissions for Cahen-
Salvador.30 Although the proposal was turned down – there were doubts oǀeƌ hoǁ a ͚high 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đoŵŵittee͛ would operate in the circumstances envisaged – the conference 
adopted a resolution urging states to investigate the matter further. French efforts to keep 
it on the diplomatic agenda in the early 1950s failed, but the issue continued to be discussed 
in other forums for a further decade. The International Law Association debated the issue at 
its annual conference in 1964, and it resonated with particular force in the International 
Committee for Military Medicine and International Committee for the Neutrality of 
Medicine, both of which were anxious to insulate military medicine from Cold War 
pressures and ensure respect for medical units operating under the conventions.31  
Cahen-“alǀadoƌ͛s pƌoposal ǁas, hoǁeǀeƌ, oŶlǇ oŶe of a Ŷuŵďeƌ of iŶitiatiǀes that 
eŵeƌged oǀeƌ the peƌiod that thƌeateŶed to uŶdeƌĐut the IC‘C͛s standing in the Red Cross 
movement and, by extension, its place in the new conventions. By the eve of the Geneva 
Conference, the ICRC faced challenges from two different directions. On the one hand, the 
eastern bloc societies, suspiĐious of the Đoŵŵittee͛s ǁesteƌŶ, ͚ďouƌgeois͛ leanings insisted 
that its ŵeŵďeƌship ďe ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶalised͛ thƌough the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ŵeŵďeƌs fƌoŵ aĐƌoss 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, some western societies were anxious to 
bridge the gap between the international committee and the umbrella organisation for the 
national societies, the League of Red Cross Societies. The Swedish, American, French and 
BelgiaŶ soĐieties all leŶt theiƌ ǀoiĐe to Đalls foƌ a ͚staŶdiŶg ĐoŵŵissioŶ͛, Đhaiƌed ďǇ the 
charismatic vice-president of the Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, to sit between 
the ICRC and the League and coordinate their respective activities.32 In both cases, the ICRC 
was confronted with a challenge to its leadership of the Red Cross family and its authority as 
the principal supervisory institution for the movement in times of war.  
Over time, the danger of a fissure opening up along Cold War lines gradually helped 
rein in some of the ǁesteƌŶ soĐieties͛ enthusiasm for reform. But while pressure on the ICRC 
ebbed, lingering doubts over the suitability of its statutes, form and membership inevitably 
coloured thinking over the wisdom of leaving the ICRC as the principal default ͚oƌgaŶ of 
ĐoŶtƌol͛ iŶ the ƌeǀised ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs.33 The Đoŵŵittee͛s very ͚“ǁissŶess͛, hitheƌto a 
guarantee for its neutrality and independence, was much less valued in a world governed by 
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a United Nations charter that cast doubt over the viability of neutrality in international 
politics, or one teetering on the brink of another global war.34 MosĐoǁ͛s outspoken criticism 
of the committee before the Stockholm conference inevitably threw such concerns into 
sharp relief. As Harold Starr, head of the American Red Cross delegation in 1948 bluntly put 
it; ͚as the IC‘C ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ persona grata with the USSR and its neighbours, it was not 
opportune, if one desires to have these states adhere to the new conventions, to allow the 
IC‘C to figuƌe pƌoŵiŶeŶtlǇ [iŶ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs]͛.35  
In line with this thinking, Starr tabled a series of proposals at Stockholm which 
effectively airbrushed the committee out of the revised conventions, and replaced it with a 
͚ĐoŵpeteŶt iŶteƌŶatioŶal ďodǇ͛, a term that was sufficiently vague to leave open the 
possibility of a variety of ad hoc institutions, whether drawn from the international Red 
Cross movement or not. The American aŵeŶdŵeŶts Ŷot oŶlǇ Đoǀeƌed pƌisoŶeƌs͛ eǆteƌŶal 
ƌelatioŶs aŶd the ͚oƌgaŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛, ďut iŶĐluded the IC‘C͛s ƌole iŶ tƌaŶsportation and relief 
activities and its place in convening the ͚Đentral POW information agency͛. It took all the tact 
and back-room diplomacy the ICRC delegates could muster to overturn the American 
initiative. Paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ laǇ iŶ the AŵeƌiĐaŶs͛ ĐoŶflatioŶ of tǁo different levels in the 
͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of pƌoteĐtioŶ͛; ŶaŵelǇ the ͚suďstitute pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛ (neutral states that 
stepped in when the original protecting powers were unable to function) and the ͚Ƌuasi 
pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛ (͚huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ suĐh as the IC‘C͛, ǁhiĐh ǁould ͚assuŵe the 
humanitarian functions peƌfoƌŵed ďǇ pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs͛ ǁheƌe state-based protection was 
not possible). NatuƌallǇ, aŶǇ thought that the IC‘C ŵight aĐt as a ͚suďstitute͛ pƌoteĐtiŶg 
poǁeƌ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ a ͚Ƌuasi͛ ;huŵaŶitaƌiaŶͿ one entailed an accretion of powers to Geneva 
that would elevate, rather than diminish, its status in the international Red Cross 
movement. The fact the ICRC itself was averse to shouldering political responsibilities under 
the convention – lest they interfere with its traditional humanitarian activities – had little 
appreciable impact on American attitudes. According to ICRC observers, it was oŶlǇ the ͚ǀeƌǇ 
digŶified͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ of the “outh African Red Cross delegate that swung the debate in the 
IC‘C͛s favour. Even then, the ICRC only remained in the Stockholm draft as aŶ ͚oƌgaŶ of 
ĐoŶtƌol͛ by a vote of 10:8.36 
“taƌƌ͛s anxiety over the danger of ŶaŵiŶg the IC‘C as a ͚Ƌuasi͛ pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌ ǁas 
not entirely without foundation. As we will see, Moscow did nothing to help the ICRC in 
North Korea after June 1950; thirty years later, it barred the ICRC from operating inside 
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Afghanistan. In 1949, however, Soviet interests lay elsewhere, and muĐh to GeŶeǀa͛s ƌelief, 
Moscow Đhose Ŷot to ĐoŶtest the IC‘C͛s positioŶ iŶ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs. IŶstead, aŶd ƌatheƌ 
uŶeǆpeĐtedlǇ, it tuƌŶed its atteŶtioŶ to the issue of the ͚suďstitute͛ pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌ. The 
crux of the Soviet position lay in their opposition to the idea that the right to choose a 
substitute lay with the detaining power, as this opened the possibility of interned Soviet 
civilians and seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ ďeiŶg ͚pƌoteĐted͛ ďǇ a state, Ŷot of MosĐoǁ͛s ĐhoosiŶg. Soviet 
concerns were principally directed towards the fate of their own personnel, but the fact that 
German and Japanese POWs were still detained in Soviet camps from the last war was 
hardly lost on the other delegates.37 MosĐoǁ͛s oppositioŶ to the ͚suďstitute pƌoteĐtiŶg 
poǁeƌ͛ clause gave rise to one of only tǁo ͚ƌeseƌǀatioŶs͛ taďled at the sigŶiŶg ĐeƌeŵoŶǇ, 
and was to have profound implications for western confidence in the POW convention over 
the succeeding decades. The Soviets ƌefused to ͚recognise the validity of requests by the 
Detaining Power to a neutral State or to a humanitarian organization, to undertake the 
functions performed by a Protecting Power, unless the consent of the Government of the 
country of which the protected person [POWs] are nationals has been obtained͛.38 
When set alongside MosĐoǁ͛s otheƌ reservation – its insistence on the right to try 
prisoners for war crimes (article 85) – Soviet objections threatened to frustrate the 
humanitarian ambitions of the conventions. IŶstead of takiŶg the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Đƌiteƌia of 
͚iŵpaƌtialitǇ͛ aŶd ͚huŵaŶitaƌiaŶisŵ͛ as good faith guarantees to be lived up to, the Soviets͛ 
sought to secure compliance through the arbitrary power to withhold consent. In reality, it 
meant that in a Soviet-US conflict, Washington would be obliged to employ a protecting 
power or humanitarian organisation in order to meet its legal obligations, even though 
Moscow, under its reservation, could withhold recognition. The Soviets, for their part, could 
insist on drawing on the services of a communist aid society or a satellite state which might, 
as a US State Department memorandum put it, ͚puƌposelǇ haǀe ďeeŶ kept apaƌt fƌoŵ the 
hostilities to ƋualifǇ as a Ŷeutƌal, to ͞pƌoteĐt͟ the iŶteƌests of U“ POWs aŶd detaiŶees in 
‘ussiaŶ haŶds͛.39 Western efforts to deal with the Soviet challenge were unsuccessful. Any 
objection to the Soviet reservations ran the danger of either delaying Soviet ratification, or 
provoking the Soviets into tabling objections to the various reservations made by the 
western powers to articles in the civilian convention.40 
For all the progress made in bolstering the supervisory regime, the new ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of 
pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ unveiled in 1949 was therefore noticeably weaker than many scholars initially 
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assumed.41 True, the IC‘C͛s status had ďeeŶ elevated: its right to intervene on behalf of 
POWs was affirmed in thirteen separate articles, and in explicitly defining its status as ͚aŶ 
iŵpaƌtial huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ ďodǇ͛ ;aƌts ϯ & ϵͿ, impartiality was acknowledged as a ͚ĐoŶstitutive 
ƋualitǇ͛ of the IC‘C (despite remaining a Swiss institution) rather than merely a principle 
observed in the course of its operations.42 But the defeat of Cahen-“alǀadoƌ͛s aŶd “taƌƌ͛s 
proposals scarcely amounted to a ringing endorsement of the Geneva committee. Indeed, 
the back room tussles only underscored the lack of confidence in the institution as currently 
conceived. Equally troubling was the position of the protecting power. Though their remit 
had been widened and clarified, the Soviet reservation cast doubt over whether this vital 
element in the POW regime could remain insulated from the corrosive effects of Cold War 
politics. 
 
*** 
 
Debate over the robustness of the 1949 ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛ oǀeƌsight ŵeĐhaŶisŵs was overtaken 
by the outbreak of fighting in Korea in June 1950. Although the 1949 conventions were not 
in force – only Switzerland had ratified them by this date, and many states suspended 
discussions for the duration of hostilities43 – the warring parties all proclaimed their 
ƌeadiŶess to adheƌe to the ͚huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ pƌiŶĐiples͛ uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs: the U.S. 
State Department in a letter to the ICRC on 3 July, and Pyongyang ten days later, on 13 July. 
Today the war is principally remembered for the politicization of the POW issue, with 
prisoners subjected to political indoctrination and scripted into propaganda films and 
broadcasts.44 Korean forces on both sides routinely ill-treated their captives, and while the 
U.N. forces were frequently shocked by the behaviour of their allies, they too had to resort 
to tanks and tear gas to restore order amongst rioting communist prisoners at the U.N. 
detention facilities at Koje-Do.45 Most famously, progress in the armistice talks, which began 
in early July 1951, were repeatedly stalled over the issue of prisoners of war, and the desire 
of the ǁesteƌŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶts to seĐuƌe agƌeeŵeŶt oŶ the pƌiŶĐiple of ͚ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ƌepatƌiatioŶ͛ 
at the close of hostilities, as a ͚suďstitute foƌ ǀiĐtoƌǇ͛ over communist forces on the 
battlefield.46 The war was also, however, an important test for the new norms of POW 
protection. As we will see, the test was failed in nearly every respect; but the practices that 
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emerged in their wake had a profound impact on the shape of international 
humanitarianism for the next half century.  
Interestingly, neither side moved to employ a protecting power at the outset of 
hostilities. While PǇoŶgǇaŶg͛s attitude toǁaƌds the issue ĐaŶ ďe deduĐed fƌoŵ its 
subsequent refusal to agree to external interference over its POW policies, the West͛s 
hesitation initially stemmed from a determination to avoid any action likely to bestow 
political legitimacy on the North Korean regime. As the U.N. intervention in Korea was 
deemed to be a ͚poliĐe aĐtioŶ͛, Ŷot a ǁaƌ, the West did not consider the new conventions 
legally binding and therefore limited their observance to only ͚suĐh detailed pƌoǀisioŶs as 
[were] appƌopƌiate to the situatioŶ͛.47 The protecting power provisions were noticeably 
excluded from these provisions.48  
The aƌƌiǀal of ChiŶese ͚ǀoluŶteeƌs͛ iŶ Korea in November 1950 and the headlong 
retreat of U.N. forces that ensued, prompted a rethink over the question of POWs in 
western capitals. The options were, however, hardly appealing. As no western state had 
recognised the North Korean regime, the coalition found itself facing precisely the situation 
envisaged in Moscow͛s reservation to the 1949 conventions. With only eastern bloc 
embassies in Pyongyang, the choice of protecting power by early 1951 came down to either 
the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia; neither of which were particularly attractive to the 
western governments.49 Action was suspended over the first half of the year in the hope 
that ICRC delegates would gain entry into North Korea. It was only in the autumn, with the 
front stabilised and armistice talks opened at Kaesong, that the U.N. Secretary General 
approached the Chinese and North Korean governments, asking them to appoint a 
substitute protecting power or accept the services of the ICRC as a ͚quasi͛ protecting 
power.50 Western governments were rightly, as it turned out, sceptical over the chances of 
success, and backed the initiative primarily to strengthen their negotiating position at 
Kaesong.51 Statements by Chou Enlai the following July, hinting at PekiŶg͛s willingness to 
recognise the 1949 conventions and the 1925 Geneva gas protocol, prompted the West to 
appeal for Soviet assistance to sway opinion in Peking and Pyongyang, but once again the 
initiative came to nought. Chou EŶlai͛s tƌuŵpetiŶg of the ϭϵϮϱ pƌotoĐol was too convenient 
foƌ ĐoŵŵuŶist pƌopagaŶda oǀeƌ the West͛s alleged use of ĐheŵiĐal ǁeapoŶs iŶ Koƌea to ďe 
taken seriously, while his flattering references to Soviet reservations in the 1949 
conventions, appeared to suggest that he was intent on trying UN airmen for war crimes, 
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while denying the ICRC access to the conflict as a substitute protecting power. In both cases, 
it ǁas diffiĐult to see hoǁ the iŶteƌests of ǁesteƌŶ POWs Đould ďe adǀaŶĐed ďǇ PekiŶg͛s 
sudden affection for the humanitarian codes.52 
 An equally instrumentalist approach can be detected in attitudes towards the ICRC. 
Geneva offered its services to both parties at the start of hostilities, but was never formally 
invited to act as a ͚Ƌuasi͛ protecting power. Consequently, just as in the 2nd World War, any 
initiatives on behalf of the prisoners depended on securing the consent of the belligerent 
governments. In the North, this was not forthcoming. Of the 200 communications sent by 
Geneva to Pyongyang between June 1950 and December 1951, only two elicited any reply. 
Paul Ruegger͛s ǀisit to Peking in the spring of 1951 provided a brief glimmer of hope, but by 
the summer it was clear that the Chinese Red Cross would Ŷot pƌess the IC‘C͛s Đase oƌ 
arrange for the distribution of medical and relief supplies. Similar approaches via Moscow 
proved equally forlorn. PekiŶg deŶied ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ the ChiŶese ͚ǀoluŶteeƌs͛ aŶd 
ƌeŵaiŶed uŶŵoǀed ďǇ GeŶeǀa͛s release of names of communist prisoners held by the 
U.N.53 The ICRC was thus forced to watch on impassively as ĐoŵŵuŶist ͚peaĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶts͛ 
and their western sympathisers were given free access to ͚ƌepoƌt͛ oŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶist camps, 
while notification of the identity of individual inmates filtered back to the West through 
staged radio broadcasts by ͚ƌe-eduĐated͛ pƌisoŶeƌs.54  
South of the 38th parallel, the situation was different. The fact that Geneva had 
nothing to show for its efforts in the North did not materially affect the scope or 
effectiveness of its advocacy and inspection work on behalf of POWs in the South. In truth, 
despite repeatedly complaining about the inconvenience and unreality of applying the POW 
convention unilaterally, the U.N. command could do little but accept the IC‘C͛s pƌeseŶĐe. To 
do otherwise would damage its international standing, add fuel to allegations over its use of 
germ warfare agents, and banish any chance of delivering aid to its prisoners in communist 
hands. Indeed, the military authorities came to ǀalue the IC‘C͛s eǆpeƌtise, and occasionally 
appealed to its delegates to assist in areas that were not explicitly ͚huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ͛.55  
The lack of any sustained effort to adopt or adapt the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ͚hierarchy of 
protection͛ should prompt us to question the depth of western commitment to these 
mechanisms. Clearly the eǆisteŶĐe of MosĐoǁ͛s reservations – aŶd Chou EŶlai͛s appaƌeŶt 
sympathy for them – cast doubts in western minds over the whole question of POW 
protection. The politicization of the POW issue during the war inevitably fanned western 
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suspicions over communist intentions, and strengthened the conviction that the 1949 
ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs ǁeƌe ͚eŶtiƌelǇ iŶadeƋuate foƌ aŶd iŶappliĐaďle to͛ a ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith the 
communist bloc.56  
The re-emergence of neutrality in the early 1950s did, it is true, raise hopes that 
͚neutral͛ and ͚impartial͛ protecting powers might yet survive the onset of the Cold War. The 
four power Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for Korea, though framing the 
European neutrals along ideological lines, implied that predictions over the imminent 
demise of neutrality were premature. MosĐoǁ͛s fliƌtatioŶ with a ͚Ŷeutƌal͛ Germany in the 
early 1950s, the signing of the Austrian State treaty in 1955, and the gradual emergence of 
͚thiƌd ǁoƌld͛ neutralism under Indian leadership, inevitably strengthened this belief, and 
goes some way to explaining the West͛s ƌeŶeǁed confidence in the Geneva conventions by 
the late 1950s. 
Yet, the real lesson taken from the Korean War was the belief that, under Cold War 
conditions, it paid to operate outside the protecting power framework. This conclusion 
obviously jarred with the concerns expressed by the U.N. coalition over the fate of its men 
in communist hands. But there is little doubt that the experience of confronting communism 
in the developing world convinced many in the U.N. command that there was some 
advantage iŶ ĐuƌtailiŶg the ǁoƌk of the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛ ͚oƌgaŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛.  The rarefied, 
academic discussions over whether the Korean War was a unique case under international 
law, soon gave way to the realisation that the conflict was ultimately a harbinger of things 
to Đoŵe. The ďeŶefit of ǁithholdiŶg politiĐal ƌeĐogŶitioŶ fƌoŵ oŶe͛s adǀersary – whether in 
the form of a puppet communist regime, or an anti-colonial insurgency – had obvious 
appeal.  
The same was true for the informal character of the IC‘C͛s mandate. Unlike the 1929 
codes, protecting power arrangements were common to all four of the 1949 conventions. 
The implications of this were not initially appreciated by the U.N. command. In August 1950 
General MacArthur confidently announced that his forces would be guided by all four 
conventions, but the conduct of fighting, not least the appalling treatment of civilians by 
South Korean troops, soon convinced him to limit his responsibility to the POW convention 
alone, and leave Seoul to answer questions on the civilian and Red Cross conventions. As 
nothing was done to advertise this change, it was not until the ICRC raised the issue in 
February 1951 that the U.S. government became aware of the situation, and not until the 
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middle of that year that the U.N. command confirmed that it was ͚Ŷot eǆteŶd[ing] 
recognition of the ICRC with respect to all four conventions because of what its delegates 
ŵight disĐoǀeƌ aŶd ƌepoƌt͛.57 Despite efforts to have the U.N. command live up to its public 
pronouncements, the Red Cross, maritime and civilian conventions were never applied to 
the Korean conflict. Indeed, the U.N. command attempted to walk back from its 
commitment to the POW convention, by trying to downgrade the status of ICRC delegates – 
fƌoŵ ͚aĐĐƌedited͛ to ͚iŶǀited͛ – and insisting that their camp reports were submitted for 
comment first, before being forwarded to the U.N. headquarters in New York.58  
The ICRC took this in its stride, and chose not to make an issue out of the U.N.͛s 
difficulties at Koje Do or elsewhere. AŵeƌiĐa͛s ͚iŶeǆpeƌieŶĐe iŶ ŵaŶagiŶg POW Đaŵps͛ 
could, Paul Ruegger wryly remarked in conversation with the British foreign secretary in 
January ϭϵϱϯ, ͚soŵetiŵes led theŵ astƌaǇ͛, ďut there was little doubt that the UN command 
was ͚doiŶg [its] best to carƌǇ out the ǀaƌious GeŶeǀa ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛.59 As for the Đoŵŵittee͛s 
part in supervising the application of the conventions, the events in Korea had clearly had a 
chastening effect on Swiss thinking. By mid-1951, the committee was increasingly warning 
its delegates to avoid encroaching into areas that properly lay within the jurisdiction of the 
protecting power.60 By that winter, as the conflict moved from the battlefield to court of 
world public opinion, the committee issued a Ŷote oŶ ͚alleged ǀiolatioŶs of iŶteƌŶatioŶal 
laǁ͛ in which it sought to clarify its remit. While admitting to exercising ͚a ĐeƌtaiŶ degƌee of 
supeƌǀisioŶ͛ over the conventions, it insisted that ͚its esseŶtial task͛ laǇ iŶ ĐaƌƌǇiŶg on ͚the 
humanitarian work entrusted to it by the Conventions and devolving on it under its Statutes 
and those of the International Red Cross. Instead of passing judgement, the Red Cross must 
ďƌiŶg help. Befoƌe theoƌiziŶg aďout pƌiŶĐiples, it ŵust tƌaŶslate theŵ iŶto aĐtioŶ͛.61 Such 
statements drew approving nods in western capitals.  
While, then, the West might sympathise, philosophically, with both the principles 
and ambitions of the new conventions, the practical experience of applying them within the 
new Cold War context, made them appear much less attractive. Far better, to pare down 
the sĐope of the ͚oƌgaŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛ aŶd ƌelǇ oŶ the tƌaditioŶal huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ fuŶĐtioŶs of the 
ICRC, than expose western conduct to the scrutiny of a protecting power, drawing on the 
full authority of the 1949 conventions. This was just as true for confrontations with the 
Soviet bloc – where captured enemy personnel would ďe ƌegaƌded ͚ŵoƌe as politiĐal 
ƌefugees thaŶ as pƌisoŶeƌs of ǁaƌ͛62, and where their adversaries questioned the whole 
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premise of ͚suďstitute͛ oƌ ͚Ƌuasi͛ pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs  – as for conflicts with insurgent 
movements in the European colonial empires or their post-colonial client states.  
 Though clearly troubled by the increasing politicisation of prisoner treatment in 
Korea, western governments could afford themselves a guarded sense of optimism over the 
shape of the POW regime. The major sticking points during the armistice negotiations – the 
right of prisoners to seek asylum and the right of parties to use unified command structures 
in dealing with POW affairs – were both resolved in the West͛s faǀouƌ.63 Moreover, North 
Koƌea͛s challenge to the Geneva ͚Ŷoƌŵs͛ had, at least in part, been overcome. The high 
death-rates amongst U.N. prisoners were shocking, but no worse than those experienced by 
Allied forces in the Far East and Pacific theatres during the last war. Political indoctrination, 
which had led twenty-one Americans and one Briton to remain in China after the end of 
hostilities, clearly rattled western militaries. But while an attentive protecting power might, 
conceivably, have helped mitigate the threat, the West could take comfort from the fact 
that the matter could be tackled through improved training in ͚resistance to interrogation͛ 
and ͚ĐoŶduĐt afteƌ Đaptuƌe͛. In all events, the majority of states who joined the U.N. 
coalition felt confident enough to ratify the POW convention within a few years of the end 
of hostilities.  
 This should not, however, lead us to belittle the impact of the Korean War on the 
development of the POW regime. The apparent self-evident importance of establishing a 
robust system of oversight for the new conventions did not long survive the conflict. Britain, 
France and Egypt employed protecting powers during the Suez crisis in 1956, but on only 
three occasions since then have states lived up to their treaty obligations and accredited 
neutral states as protecting powers, and on each occasion, ͚exceptional͛ circumstances were 
deemed to apply.64 It is ironic that just as the ͚oƌgaŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛ in international 
humanitarian law reached their apogee, the international community chose to dispense 
with their services. The tireless work of the ICRC has ensured that we have not seen the 
complete return to barbarism that many had feared. But in insisting that it would ͚bring 
help͛, not ͚pass judgement͛ in its work, the ICRC was not merely reciting its founding 
mantra; it was, instead, retreating from a tradition of advocacy and debate that it had 
propagated during the Great War, but had increasingly discarded since the early 1940s. No 
doubt, in the politically charged world of the Cold War, this shift was wise, but it has left the 
conventions largely under-supervised and allowed belligerents to ignore their treaty 
17 
 
obligations without fear of serious censure. Just as iŶ Koƌea, ͚ƌeĐipƌoĐitǇ͛ has had little 
appreciable effect on belligerent behaviour. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of armed 
conflict since 1945 has been the denial of recipƌoĐitǇ; ǁhetheƌ iŶ the ͚ďush-fiƌe͛ ǁaƌs of 
decolonisation, the inter-state conflicts along the political fault lines in South Asia or the 
Gulf, oƌ the ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt episodes iŶ the ͚gloďal ǁaƌ oŶ teƌƌoƌ͛, ǁith tƌagiĐ ƌesults foƌ those 
detained by their enemies. Moreover, it was not merely in the contraction of the 
humanitarian space where the absence of a protecting power was felt. The protecting 
powers were equipped and empowered to hold belligerents to account across a range of 
diplomatic and humanitarian concerns. It is surely telling, that in deliberating over what it 
had learnt from the Korean War, the ICRC was firmly of the view that had protecting powers 
been present, political tensions between the belligerents would have been eased, and the 
armistice negotiations brought to a speedier conclusion. It was for this reason that the 
committee spoke out in favour of protecting powers in international discussions over the 
course of the 1950s and 1960s.65 As one senior member of the committee, Frédéric Siordet, 
remarked in July ϭϵϱϰ, ͚if pƌoteĐtiŶg poǁeƌs aƌe Ŷot aďle to aĐĐoŵplish theiƌ tasks iŶ good 
faith, then the entire appliĐatioŶ of the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs is Đoŵpƌoŵised͛.66 The history of the 
last sixty years sadly bears out his depressing prognosis. 
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